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Abstract 
 
A careful evaluation of diaries and 
memoirs of British temporary officers in 
World War I suggests that the class 
consciousness and Regular Army ideals 
inculcated during training had little bearing 
on officers’ actual experiences on the front 
lines. Their accounts confirm previous 
scholars’ conclusions about the presence of 
class feelings among officers, but the value 
they place on military effectiveness in the 
trenches is much more significant. After 
1914, high casualty rates among junior 
officers forced the British army to seek 
candidates for commissions from social 
classes that, before the war, would not have 
been considered officer material. Accounts 
from both the traditional officer class and 
from the working class reveal new officers’ 
conscious attempts, encouraged by their 
superiors, to conform to the pre-war Regular 
Army ideal of the “officer and gentleman.”  
These attempts, as well as the very existence 
of the term “temporary gentleman,” 
demonstrate the new officers’ consciousness 
of their artificial elevation to the status of 
gentlemen. But the diaries and memoirs 
reveal that, on the front lines, an “efficient” 
officer was highly valued, whatever his 
social background. 
 
Heavy casualty rates among junior 
officers during the first year of World War I 
forced the British army to seek officer 
candidates from social classes not 
previously thought to be officer material.  
Most of these new officers were 
commissioned from the ranks, for the 
duration only, and the term “Temporary 
Gentleman” was born. The origins of the 
term are unclear, but it was in use in Britain 
by 1916, when a book of letters was 
published by the War Department under the 
title A ‘Temporary Gentleman’ in France: 
home letters from an officer at the front.1 It 
is an interesting term – traditionally, if one 
was a gentleman, one was born and died a 
gentleman. The status was conferred by 
birth and education. But status as an officer 
in the British Army also indicated 
gentlemanly status, the “officer and 
gentleman,” and the connection continued 
despite lower-class men being offered 
temporary and artificial elevation to this 
status. This research in part explores 
personal accounts from both traditional 
officer classes, with regular commissions, 
and non-traditional officers commissioned 
from the ranks, in order to assess officers’ 
consciousness of being or serving with 
“Temporary Gentlemen” during the war.2   
 The officers’ accounts record either 
their own or others’ efforts to conform to 
ideals and behavior of Regular officers.  
These attempts, as well as the very existence 
of the term “Temporary Gentleman,” 
demonstrate the new officers’ consciousness 
of their artificial elevation to the status of 
gentlemen. But the diaries and memoirs 
reveal that, on the front lines, an “efficient” 
officer was highly valued, whatever his 
social background. A close examination of 
these officers’ accounts, in conjunction with 
contemporary accounts of officer training, 
  
reveals an important distinction between the 
practical and the pretentious. New officers 
should conform to practical Regular Army 
ideals of bravery, leadership and efficiency, 
but should not pretend to be people they 
were not by feigning interest in 
horsemanship or emulating “public school 
behavior” like manners and accent, 
traditional markers of gentlemanly status.  
Edwin Campion Vaughan’s diary, 
particularly, indicates that there was little 
time or patience at the front for arrogance or 
pretension. Attempts to pretend in such a 
manner generally resulted in snobbish 
insults, even from fellow lower-class 
officers.  
The memoirs and diaries 
demonstrate that social evaluation among 
junior officers, on the front lines at least, had 
become based on individual merit and 
practicality, not on educational, 
occupational, or family background.  
Likewise, snobbishness tended to be 
directed towards “inefficient” officers rather 
than lowborn ones. That this change did not 
persist after the war, and did not even 
completely penetrate the upper ranks during 
the war, illustrates its basis in practicality 
and its origin in extraordinary circumstances 
not found at home or in peacetime military 
experience.3 As the phrase “Temporary 
Gentleman” indicates, these officers’ 
elevation to the status of gentlemen was as 
temporary and separate an experience as life 
in the trenches, and when their particular 
brand of military effectiveness was no 
longer needed, their elevation was no longer 
practical or valid. Whether these officers 
were aware of the coming devaluation of 
their status is uncertain, and it is more useful 
and appropriate to concentrate on what they 
do reveal about their front-line experiences.  
A definition of Regular Army ideals, an 
evaluation of secondary scholarship, as well 
as an examination of propagandistic 
documents published during the war, all 
augment the information mined from the 
officers’ accounts to paint a more complete 
picture of the “Temporary Gentleman’s” 
experience, origins, and class-consciousness. 
It is important to understand pre-war 
Regular Army tradition and conceptions of 
gentlemanliness before analyzing how these 
traditions and conceptions changed on the 
front lines. In the Regular army, standards of 
dress, speech and behavior differentiated 
officers from men in the ranks. There was a 
belief in the army that soldiers preferred to 
be officered by gentlemen rather than by 
those from their own class.4 Young men 
from gentry and upper middle-class families 
with public school and possibly university 
education were considered officer material.  
These men were typically “not used to much 
brain work.”5 A background in hunting was 
also highly valued, and competent riding 
was an essential part of an officer’s life. An 
independent income was essential, since 
Army pay was not sufficient to provide 
living expenses, let alone support necessary 
equipment and expenses for polo, hunting, 
and fine dining, and an officer was evaluated 
by his peers based on his ability to maintain 
the sporting and gentlemanly lifestyle.6   
Financial restrictions alone excluded lower-
class men from seeking commissions, but, 
had there not been monetary barriers, the 
social and educational gaps were enough to 
discourage the types of men who were 
commissioned during World War I from 
aspiring to commissions before the war.   
There were three routes to permanent 
commission in the Regular army that existed 
both before and during the war – Sandhurst 
(the Royal Military College), Woolwich (the 
Royal Military Academy) and the Special 
Reserve.7 Public schools and universities 
had Officer Training Corps to prepare their 
students for the military academies, so by 
the time young officers were commissioned, 
some had been training for assuming 
military leadership roles since the age of 
  
thirteen. Family background was also 
important – most officers before the war 
were sons of either gentlemen or military 
professionals, and many were from families 
well established in producing officers from 
the young men of every generation.8 
World War I trench warfare and its 
command style relied heavily on junior 
officers as platoon and section leaders on the 
front lines. As a result, casualty rates among 
officers were proportionally much higher 
than rates among the men. Most of the 
permanently commissioned Regular officers 
died in the first year of the war. These 
officers had to be replaced, but Sandhurst 
and Woolwich were not producing enough 
officers quickly enough.9 Temporary 
commissions were issued to men from the 
ranks, but in the beginning of the process, 
before the system was reformed in the 
summer of 1916, many of the officers were 
middle-class ex-schoolboys and white-collar 
workers commissioned directly from civilian 
life who had no experience in the Army.10   
Their ideas and examples of proper behavior 
as an officer came not from experience 
under officers on the front lines, but from 
popular literature and largely romanticized 
historical knowledge about British officers.  
After the middle of 1916, orders were given 
that all new temporary officers were to be 
commissioned from the ranks, and the 
candidates must be recommended by their 
commanding officer.11 The order resulted in 
increasing numbers of officers from 
working-class backgrounds, with no 
familiarity with upper levels of army social 
hierarchy. 
In 1917 Captain Basil Williams 
wrote a propagandistic work explaining the 
methods used in raising and training the 
New Armies.12 This account of training 
sought to reassure British readers and refute 
attitudes that the quality of the New Army 
and its temporary officers was deteriorating 
as the war went on. These attitudes stemmed 
from the connection that was still in place at 
home in Britain, and among senior officers 
who did not serve much on the front lines, 
that ability to be an officer and a gentleman 
was tied to social and educational 
background.13 Experiences with training and 
serving with “Temporary Gentlemen” 
changed this perception. It was a meeting of 
“two nations,” forcing interaction between 
class groups who would have been highly 
unlikely to socialize in peacetime.14 A pre-
war Regular officer compared training of 
new officers from the ranks with this 
dictum: “You can’t make a silk purse out of 
a sow’s ear, but you can make a good leather 
one.”15 He acknowledged that the new 
officers were somewhat uncouth, and 
although there is a degree of snobbishness in 
calling them “sow’s ears,” their social 
background did not prevent them from being 
fully functional, strong officers on the front 
lines. Silk (that is, horsemanship, manners 
and breeding) would be nice, and had its 
place in the Mess and regimental polo field, 
but leather (bravery and effectiveness) 
proved more practical and praiseworthy in 
the trenches.   
Robert Graves’s account of his war 
experiences, found in his autobiography, 
Goodbye to All That, illustrates quite 
powerfully and humorously the conflict 
between Regular army tradition and front-
line effectiveness.16 The conflict, for Graves, 
stemmed from a certain amount of Regular 
army “childishness,” including strict Mess 
rules and required riding lessons and polo 
matches.17 At the same time, even though 
certain aspects of this tradition were 
ridiculous to him, he still would rather be 
with this battalion than with any other.  
Traditions of discipline and trustworthiness 
were a part of the Royal Welch Fusiliers, 
even though Graves humorously observed 
that, regarding the war, “the Royal Welch 
don’t recognize it socially.”18 Graves 
acknowledges that adherence to certain 
  
aspects of traditional officer life was silly 
and unnecessary given the current style of 
trench warfare, but other aspects, practical 
and useful ones like strict discipline and a 
reliable command structure, made a unit 
much more effective and safe on the front 
lines. 
Graves was a Special Reservist with 
the rank of captain with the Royal Welch 
Fusiliers. His commission was a permanent 
one – typically, officers commissioned from 
the Special Reserves were carefully selected 
and tended to be from the traditional officer 
classes.19 Graves was educated at 
Charterhouse, a public school, and came 
from a reputable family, although several 
close relatives were German, a fact Graves 
attempted to hide when it seemed to put him 
at a disadvantage (like in the war.) He was 
not, then, a “Temporary Gentleman.” From 
that position, his impression of the New 
Army was unfavorable; he wrote, “ the 
general impression here is that the New 
Army divisions can’t be of much military 
use.”20 He did admit, though, that their 
clean, fresh appearance made his own 
battalion feel like scarecrows – the New 
Army units were inexperienced and untried, 
and still looked polished and nice, but more 
important to Graves was their military 
effectiveness.21 He also had great scorn for 
the Public School Battalions, filled with men 
who were his social equals, but who were 
incompetent at reading maps and patrolling.  
He called the battalion and its officers a 
“constant embarrassment” to the Brigade.22  
“It is not fair,” he records one of his colonels 
having said, “putting brave men like ours 
alongside that crowd.”23 Graves’s 
sentiments of snobbery are directed at 
incompetence.   
 As the war continued, Graves was 
struck with changes in his battalion – the 
riding school for officers was abolished, 
there were no Regular officers except for a 
few “newly arrived Sandhurst boys,” and 
manners were much more relaxed.24 He was 
assigned an instructor job at an Officer 
Cadet Battalion, one of many created in the 
middle of 1916 to train recommended men 
from the ranks and boys freshly out of the 
public schools. Basil Williams argues in his 
training account that the officer candidates 
were treated equally, despite differences in 
social background. This equality placed 
everyone on equal footing and produced 
effective leaders.25 Graves’s experiences as 
an instructor convinced him that, though the 
officers had deteriorated from the 
“regimental point of view, [that is, from the 
strict social standards of the Royal Welch,] 
their greater efficiency in action amply 
compensated for their deficiency in 
manners.”26 The test he and the other 
instructors administered to judge passage or 
failure of the course was a soccer or rugby 
game, and those who “played rough but not 
dirty” and had quick reactions passed and 
were commissioned. These standards of 
officer material are quite different from, and 
distinctly more practical than, pre-war 
standards of birth and education. 27 
 Siegfried Sassoon, like Graves, held 
a permanent commission from the Special 
Reserves and served in the Royal Welch 
Fusiliers, although usually in a different 
battalion from Graves. Their backgrounds 
are similar in many ways, although Sassoon 
was a practiced rider and huntsman from the 
country, a crucial requisite for commission 
before the war, while Graves was not. They 
were friends and fellow poets, and both 
shared the burden of German names in an 
anti-German war – Graves’s surname 
technically included “von Runicke.”  
Sassoon left both memoirs and a published 
diary describing his war experiences. In his 
memoirs, written in the late 1920s, Sassoon 
calls the term “Temporary Gentleman” a 
“disgusting phrase.”28 Yet, while many of 
his sentiments toward new temporary 
officers mirrored Graves’s, Sassoon is 
  
distinctly more socially snobbish than 
Graves in his account of his fellow officers. 
Perhaps his awareness of belonging to the 
hunting-man elite and his upbringing 
completely separate from lower class people 
were factors. One entry, describing his 
February 1918 trip over to France after leave 
in Palestine, states that there were “very few 
intelligent, sensitive faces” about, and calls 
his fellow officers “riff-raff,” complaining 
that they are always playing poker in the 
Mess.29 A similar passage appears two years 
earlier, in May of 1916: 
 
Of all the officers having dinner, I saw no 
face with any touch of distinction in it.  
They were either utterly commonplace or 
self-satisfied, or else tired-looking, feeble, 
goggle-eyed, or otherwise deficient.  Why 
does one see so few proper-looking 
officers?30 
 
He disapproves of self-satisfied, 
pretentious behavior. But, despite this 
disdain for other officers’ manners, it is 
crucial to note that, right after he deplores 
their “feeble” or “deficient” appearance, he 
states, “Yet, our army does all right.” While 
the admission is in this case somewhat 
grudging, Sassoon makes the distinction 
between evaluating soldiers based on doing 
“all right,” and evaluating based on manners 
and appearance. While both bases may have 
been valid to him, practicality won out in the 
trenches. In his diary, Sassoon recorded a 
story about a former lance corporal in his 
battalion who had recently been 
commissioned. This officer arrived on 
parade drunk. Sassoon found him to be a 
bad officer, “quite irresponsible and not 
trustworthy,” and disdained his habit of 
swaggering about, making vulgar 
comments.31 Not only are this officer’s 
manners offensive to Sassoon, but his lack 
of military discipline and effectiveness as 
leader disgust him as well.  
Another illustration of this habit of 
Sassoon’s to actually couple social snobbery 
with more practical evaluations can be found 
in his memoirs, in his reactions to several 
fellow officers. G. Vivian-Simpson was a 
volunteer temporary officer, formerly a bank 
clerk, who was irritatingly keen to “air his 
social eligibility,” yet was potentially a 
competent officer. Sassoon points out that 
he later proved greedy and unreliable, and 
he was shot at Ypres on his way to a second 
breakfast.32 Another officer, Mansfield, had 
style and fire in his word of command, 
although he was not from a hunting 
background like Sassoon, whose “view 
halloa” was passable but whose word of 
command was initially unconvincing.33 He 
later compared two other fellow officers, 
Rees (a short, uncouth Welshman) and 
Shirley (a former public school boy). Rees 
got on Sassoon’s and Shirley’s nerves with 
his table manners, but Sassoon found that 
social incompatibilities merged on the front 
lines into “communal discomfort.” In the 
trenches, Rees was the better of the two, 
making jokes and talking incessantly to keep 
up his courage, while Shirley, “true to the 
traditions of his class,” simulated a 
nonchalance that he could not get into his 
eyes.34 
 Samuel Hynes has argued that an 
upper middle-class background and public 
school education were actually a liability on 
the front lines, just as Sassoon points out in 
the case of Shirley. At these schools, boys 
are trained to repress outward signs of 
emotion, if not to suppress the entire 
emotion itself.35 Contemporary research into 
shell shock and war-induced breakdown 
indicated that suppression of emotion eroded 
an officer’s mental defenses over time, and 
could cause psychological problems bad 
enough to warrant leaving the lines and 
going to a hospital.36 There is a particularly 
descriptive account of this in Charles 
Carrington’s memoir, in which he narrates 
  
his close brush with mental breakdown 
during a night and day of heavy shell fire, 
brought about by his frantic efforts to 
repress his fear and appear nonchalant. 37  
This incident indicates that he is probably 
from a public school background. His 
educational and social background before 
the war is not given to the reader. He 
attended Oxford University soon after the 
war ended, where he wrote a large part of 
his memoirs, although they were not 
published until 1930. 
  Carrington appears in his memoirs as 
Charles Edmonds, much in the same way 
that Sassoon appears in his own as George 
Sherston. He was originally a private in a 
volunteer regiment, evidently with no 
previous military background, but his 
anxiety to get to France was frustrated by his 
regiment’s quartering in Britain. He “got 
[his] uncle to pull some strings” and was 
given a commission in another regiment.38  
Carrington’s perspective on “Temporary 
Gentlemen” is interesting, then, because it is 
uncertain whether he was considered one 
himself. He does not directly admit to being 
one (in fact, none of the writers directly use 
the phrase “Temporary Gentleman” in their 
accounts, besides Sassoon, in his memoir 
written much later) and he cheerfully states 
that, “if it was fun to be a Tommy, it was ten 
times more fun to be a subaltern in 
Kitchener’s Army. There was scope….”39 
The memoirs are largely unconcerned with 
other officers or Carrington’s perceptions of 
them. Much more than Graves or Sassoon, 
Carrington was concerned with how his men 
and noncommissioned officers judged his 
own leadership. In fact, he was happiest 
when he was isolated with his men in 
situations where distinctions of rank broke 
down.40 He frequently deferred to his 
sergeants and veteran privates when he was 
uncertain about what orders he should give, 
and often mentions his efforts to “keep up 
appearances” in front of his men and fellow 
officers.41 From context these “appearances” 
equate with bravery. “Windiness,” or fright, 
was a sign of weakness for him, which he 
sometimes applied to himself but never to 
his fellow officers. 
 It would be an oversight not to point 
out that Carrington’s work is full of pride in 
traditional military discipline and regimental 
enthusiasm. One interesting episode in his 
memoirs is the appearance of a colonel in 
the trenches with Carrington and his men.  
Carrington admired the colonel – in fact, he 
calls him his hero. It is important to note 
what precisely Carrington admired – the 
colonel’s clothes, horsemanship, “incisive” 
speech, and his adventurous past in the Boer 
War.42 The romantic image of the Regular 
officer was still very powerful in the minds 
of soldiers and temporary officers, and 
Carrington assigns to the colonel’s attributes 
the power of restoring calm in the line at a 
time of particular panic and trouble. He 
compares the colonel to a Caesar who 
“snatched up a shield and stood in the ranks 
of the Tenth Legion.”43 Even in this 
somewhat romantic account of the colonel’s 
appearance, Carrington attributes great 
importance to his ability to calm the soldiers 
in the trenches. His social status as an 
officer and a gentleman was clearly 
acknowledged and admired, but it was 
admired for its tangible effects on discipline 
and morale. This episode is similar to 
Graves’s account of his first impressions of 
the Welch Fusilier officers, although Graves 
was antagonized, while Carrington was 
uplifted.44 Regular army traditions that 
resulted in good front-line discipline and 
morale were traditions highly sought after 
and properly emulated by new junior 
officers. 
Carrington’s account is interesting 
and challenging to analyze for evidence of 
class-consciousness because snobbery is 
nearly absent in this work, as are 
descriptions of people’s social background.  
  
Instead, during training (and afterward, 
although he does not admit this) he “paid 
blind hero worship to any soldier who would 
teach [him] his trade.”45 A useful conclusion 
can be drawn from that. “Any soldier” 
includes working-class privates and 
noncommissioned officers just as much as it 
includes colonels. Carrington is exclusively 
concerned with narrating his own 
development as an effective leader. During 
his initial training, he and the other new 
officers “carried [them]selves with no end of 
swagger, each trying to be the devil of a 
fellow.”46 Later, during a successful 
maneuver for which he was later decorated, 
Carrington’s pride derives from functional 
military discipline. “All the messages which 
I had proudly composed in such careful 
military form [had] gone astray,” he 
writes.47 His shift to the use of bravery, 
experience and efficiency as bases of 
judgment, rather than conformation to 
Regular army social standards, illustrates his 
conviction that effectiveness in the trenches 
made a line officer good, just as it made an 
enlisted soldier good. 
Edwin Campion Vaughan’s diary is 
similar to Carrington’s account in its focus 
on practicality, although it is far more 
critical in tone. Vaughan was commissioned 
at age 19 into the Royal Warwickshire 
Regiment in late 1916. From an introduction 
to his published diary, one learns that he was 
the son of an Irish Catholic customs officer, 
and was educated in a Jesuit school.48 He 
would not have been considered officer 
material before the war both for his religious 
conviction and for his inferior parentage.  
He was commissioned from the ranks, as all 
new officers were after 1916, but his diary 
begins with his first days as an officer on the 
way to France, where he seemed to be going 
for the first time. Most likely, then, his time 
as a private was spent exclusively in 
England.   
Given Vaughan’s inexperience with 
army life on the Western Front and his 
general inexperience with army traditions as 
a result of his lower middle-class 
background, he was forced to develop his 
own standards of judging himself and others 
in leadership positions in a way that Sassoon 
and Graves were not. Additionally, unlike 
Carrington, who was similarly 
inexperienced, there was little difference 
between the social class of Vaughan and that 
of many of his men. Therefore, it is useful to 
trace both Vaughan’s reaction to other 
officers and other officers’ reactions to him.    
Vaughan had a difficult time getting along 
with his fellow officers in France. On one 
occasion, after marching his men several 
miles through a storm, he reached 
headquarters only to be ignored by the 
officers inside after he came in to ask for 
directions. Vaughan became “cross,” and 
informed the Staff Lieutenant that he was 
entitled to more courtesy than he had been 
shown, and that his troops were out in the 
cold. After what he considered to be an 
inadequate response, Vaughan called the 
officers “inefficient” for failing to organize 
proper quarters for his men and told them to 
go to hell.49 Vaughan’s anger in this 
situation is in part due to the lack of respect 
shown to him, but he lays more importance 
on the officers’ lack of concern for his men.  
He is distinctly arrogant here, and the 
arrogance derives from his disdain for 
inefficiency. Vaughan’s account of another 
officer, this time “Second Loot,” further 
illustrates Vaughan’s scorn for officers who 
fail to act responsibly. The new officer, 
upon arrival, performed a “long, slow stage 
salute” to the commanding officer and 
addressed everyone in stilted, pretentious 
tones:  
 
Sir. I am pleased and proud to have the 
honour of meeting you in the scene of 
operations. And I can assure you that I will 
  
do my best to serve you, and my king, at a 
top rate. I’ve crossed over to make good and 
to help the old country all ends up.50 
 
Vaughan saw this behavior as 
ridiculous and impractical. The new arrival 
was originally a commercial traveler from 
Birmingham (one of the few direct 
references to people’s backgrounds in 
Vaughan’s diary) and later “ran off” after 
receiving a slight wound. Vaughan wished 
this pretentious but unsubstantial officer 
“good riddance.”51 He views a Captain 
Taylor with similar scorn, and for similar 
reasons. Captain Taylor (whom Vaughan 
calls, “the poor thing”), intentionally spoke 
to “no one below his own rank” and took a 
condescending tone with young officers.52 
Vaughan views these figures, both 
attempting to distinguish themselves by 
emulating what they think are proper 
Regular army codes of behavior for officers, 
as pitiable and intolerable men whose 
pretensions did not contribute usefully to 
front-line effectiveness.   
 Vaughan’s diary indicates that he 
initially felt a certain pressure to conform to 
his superiors’ ideals of officer behavior.  
When asked to join a ride to a nearby town, 
he states, “… although I had never been on a 
horse before, I did not like to refuse.”53 
There was still a significant connection 
between being an officer and being a 
competent horseman. Robert Graves also 
experienced this during his time with the 
Royal Welch, when, since he didn’t “ride 
like an angel,” he participated in a riding 
school every afternoon in billets.54 Later in 
the war, his battalion stopped the riding 
school, which occurrence Graves explains as 
one of many losses of pre-war tradition due 
to the dearth of Regular officers who 
actually cared that these traditions were 
kept.  Riding was a tradition that had 
practical use during marches and transport, 
but no use at all in actual trench warfare. In 
Vaughan’s regiment, riding lessons were 
still required. His ineptitude at riding 
became evident after that first day’s ride, 
and Vaughan frequently mentions being 
forced to attend lessons, which often 
provided humor. During one lesson, “the 
whole village was startled by a cavalcade of 
shaggy horses clattering through the main 
street with purple-faced young officers 
clinging to their saddles. We had no more 
riding instruction.”55    
Evaluating other officers’ 
assessments of Vaughan is equally as 
important as evaluating Vaughan’s 
assessments of his colleagues. Vaughan 
chose to record several situations in his 
diary that embarrassed him or enraged his 
sense of self-respect. One account is of a 
mistake he made and a resulting lecture ten 
days later from Pepper, a senior officer. 
Vaughan was short on wiring supplies, and 
telephoned to Headquarters to ask for more. 
He gave his unit’s exact location (which was 
forbidden in case the Germans had gotten 
access to the telephone lines) and was 
immediately hung up on. Later he was 
summoned to Headquarters, and he thought 
perhaps he was up for a promotion for his 
diligence in wiring. Instead, he encountered 
a group of staff officers who deliberately 
embarrassed him by asking, “who on earth is 
this?” when he arrived, although they clearly 
knew. An officer named Hoskins then began 
lecturing him about not being stupid enough 
to give secrets to the Germans. Vaughan’s 
reaction to this situation is revealing. “Now, 
Hoskins,” he wrote, “is only a 2nd Lieutenant 
acting Captain, and he’s never done any 
service in the line. So I wasn’t inclined to 
take a choke off from him.” Vaughan 
interrupted Hoskins, saluted the 
commanding officer, and walked off.56 He 
was lectured again ten days later. Pepper 
told him that the other officers despised his 
“arrogant unsociableness” and saw him as 
an “inefficient young officer.” This was 
  
because he, Vaughan, was still an 
“inexperienced young urchin” and did not 
show proper respect for others who had been 
out for months or years.57 When reading this 
lecture, one is reminded of his first 
encounter at headquarters, where he called 
the officers inefficient and told them to go to 
hell. Vaughan, of course, records that the 
lecture was unwarranted, and that his 
mistake was due to ignorance. 
Snobbishness played an important 
role in Vaughan’s army experience. He was 
sometimes on the receiving end, as in the 
subjection to riding lessons and his 
treatment at Headquarters, but when he was 
the one belittling others, his feelings of self-
importance derived from his disdain of 
irresponsibility or effectiveness. The 
problem was, in most instances, including 
the lecture after his telephone blunder, he 
saw his own efforts at leadership to be far 
superior to the other officers’. That Pepper 
lectured him for not showing enough respect 
to those more experienced than him 
illustrates Vaughan’s initial inability to 
conform to a new sort of social hierarchy 
that developed in the trenches, where 
deference was given to seasoned veterans 
and those with practical and effective 
leadership skills. Charles Carrington notes 
this deference in his account, recording that 
he was quite willing to consult his veteran 
noncommissioned officers when there were 
no other officers around to issue orders.  
With a new social hierarchy based on 
experience and practicality, there was a new 
form of snobbishness. Vaughan’s arrogant 
attitude was seen as ridiculous early in his 
service in France because he lacked the 
experience to justify it – he was pretentious, 
although seemingly not intentionally so.  
And, as has been seen in the other officers’ 
accounts, no pretentiousness of any kind 
was appreciated on the front lines.    
 If class-consciousness is nearly 
absent in Edwin Campion Vaughan’s diary, 
it is glaringly present in A “Temporary 
Gentleman” in France: home letters from an 
officer at the front. This account was 
published by the War Department in Britain 
in 1916, and reprinted in 1918 for American 
audiences. It is presented in the form of 
narrative letters from an officer who even 
signs himself “Your ‘Temporary 
Gentleman,’” collected and published by 
Captain A. J. Dawson. If one analyzed this 
document in the same way as the four 
others, without knowledge of its origins or 
intent, one would draw quite a different 
conclusion about class-consciousness among 
officers. But this document is properly 
analyzed as a propaganda piece proposing 
the War Department’s official stance on 
“Temporary Gentlemen” and showing the 
government’s attempt to glorify these 
officers and reassure the public. A detailed 
account of the officer’s background and 
upbringing (including his widowed mother’s 
noble sacrifices for his education and his 
own job as an auctioneer’s clerk) precedes 
an account of his patriotic enlistment in the 
army. With a nod to the new system of 
commissioning from the ranks, this work 
points out that, like the protagonist, there 
were many hundreds of men in the ranks 
who had the makings of a good officer.58 
The “Temporary Gentleman” has a jolly 
time in France, bravely doing his duty, 
cheerfully reminding his readers that the 
New Army is perfectly competent, happy to 
be considered an officer and a gentleman, 
and in the end returning safely to England 
with a wound. The existence of this account 
confirms the existence of the term 
“Temporary Gentleman” by 1916. It is 
surprising, given the term’s existence at the 
time, that the officers’ accounts do not 
mention it more often. Perhaps they all 
found the term as “disgusting” as Siegfried 
Sassoon did in his memoirs. 
 “Temporary Gentlemen” knew that 
their status as gentlemen, like their 
  
commissions, ended when the war was over.  
Martin Petter has traced significant social 
problems after the war to the fact that when 
these “Temporary Gentlemen” were 
demobilized, they were “de-officered” as 
well, and returned to their civilian lives and 
jobs (if the jobs were still available, and 
many were not) as working-class men who 
took orders, not gave them.59 An 
understanding of the nature of the problem 
faced by soon-to-be former officers cannot 
be gained without an understanding of how 
these temporary officers came to be 
commissioned and how they saw 
themselves. They were elevated to officer 
status out of necessity, because the British 
army had no other choice. Their evaluations 
of themselves and other officers were based 
on battle experience and effectiveness as 
leaders, and more traditional officers like 
Sassoon and Graves admitted that their lack 
of social graces was compensated by their 
effectiveness in the field. Likewise, an 
inefficient officer was useless, whatever his 
background. Robert Graves retained his 
position at the Officer Cadet Battalion after 
the war was ended, since training of men 
from the ranks did not stop right away. He 
notes that the post-war arrivals were “a 
constant cause of shame,” with ghastly table 
manners and drunkenness on parade.60  
Graves has reverted to pre-war evaluations 
of officers, since wartime evaluations were 
no longer practicable. These particular 
candidates were not given any chance to 
improve and show their effectiveness in the 
trenches. The new standards of evaluation 
that developed as the war went on, which 
are so obvious in accounts like Graves’s and 
Vaughan’s, ended with the Armistice. 
 World War I created a new social 
hierarchy in the trenches – in a sense, 
instead of taking one’s birth and upbringing 
into account, the new standards took into 
account one’s record of service in the 
trenches. An officer’s “birth” was his first 
tour of duty on the front lines. In that sense, 
the war was a social leveler. Siegfried 
Sassoon wrote, “things were being said and 
done which would have been considered 
madness before the war. The effects of the 
War had been the reverse of ennobling, it 
seemed. Social historians can decide 
whether I am wrong about it.”61 Social 
historians have concluded that the 
experience of the British “Temporary 
Gentleman” was one tinged with social 
snobbery, and yet they also argue that these 
new officers were seen as good leaders and 
refute the claim that officer quality 
deteriorated as the war went on.62 
Recognition of the new standards of 
evaluating officers, based on practical skills 
and leadership, is part of the solution to this 
seemingly self-contradictory and thus 
incomplete conclusion. The pre-war 
traditions of officer behavior operated in 
parallel, but with a distinct disadvantage, to 
these new, more practical traditions, creating 
a complex system of snobbery based in both 
systems. These sets of traditions were 
largely mutually exclusive, except in 
instances where, as in Graves’s and 
Carrington’s accounts, pre-war traditions of 
discipline and command structure prove 
useful in the trenches. Thus, consulting these 
officers’ accounts in order to answer the 
question of whether “Temporary 
Gentlemen” were conscious of their own 
inferior social class and whether it affected 
their performance on the front proved to be 
too simplistic an approach. Temporarily, in 
the trenches, social class had ceased to be 
the measure of an officer. 
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